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xiii
How should I describe myself to you at this moment? You would 
scarcely be surprised if I told you that I am now at my desk, absorbed in 
thought. I entertain an idea, consider its shortcomings, play with another, 
extend its possibilities, and slowly I am moved to write. I try fi tfully to trans-
form these fl eeting states of mind into words, hoping that these pages will 
allow you, the reader, to understand my thoughts. Doesn’t this sound quite 
reasonable?
Consider again: How does this commonplace passage defi ne me as a 
writer? And in defi ning me, what does it tell us about our conceptions of 
being human? In important respects, we fi nd here a picture of me as an 
individual thinker, dwelling in an interior world of consciousness that is 
all my own. And by implication, isn’t this to say that we are each alone 
in our inner worlds? We have no direct access to each other’s thoughts, 
and it is often diffi cult to translate thoughts into words. It is a world in 
which you can never plumb the depths of my mind; you will never fully 
understand me. And too, your private world will always be a mystery 
to me. In effect, this common account is one that defi nes us in terms of 
alienated beings. 
“So what,” you may respond. “It is simply a fact that we are separate 
individuals, each living in a private consciousness. That’s just life.” Or is it? 
If we accept this view of ourselves as bounded beings, the essential “me” 
dwelling behind the eyeballs, then we must continuously confront issues 
of separation. I must always be on guard, lest others see the faults in my 
prologue
TOWARD A NEW ENLIGHTENMENT
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xiv PROLOGUE
thinking, the cesspools of my emotions, and the embarrassing motives 
behind my actions. It is also a world in which I must worry about how 
I compare to others, and whether I will be judged inferior. This view per-
vades our schools and organizations, where individual evaluation haunts 
our steps from the fi rst moment we step into a classroom to our ultimate 
retirement. And thus we compete, tooth and claw, for ascendance over 
others. Self-esteem continuously hangs in the balance; the possibility of 
failure and depression is always at the doorstep. Under these conditions, 
what is the value of other people? Are they not primarily instruments for 
our own pleasure or self-gain? If they do not contribute to our well-being, 
should we not avoid or abandon them? If they actively interfere with our 
well-being, are we not justifi ed in punishing, incarcerating or even elimi-
nating them? This same attitude of me versus you insinuates itself as well 
into our views, nature and other cultures. It is always a matter of whose 
welfare is at stake.
Again, you may resist: “Yes, I can see there are problems, and some-
times we do take steps to correct them. At the same time, however, compe-
tition is also valuable. And winning is one of life’s great pleasures. Besides, 
we are speaking of human nature here. So stop complaining and pull up 
your socks.” Yet, is this human nature after all? As historians report, 
the view of the individual as singular and separate, one whose abilities to 
think and feel are central to life, and whose capacity for voluntary action 
is prized, is of recent origin. It is a conception of human nature that took 
root only four centuries ago, during a period that we now view as the 
Enlightenment. It was during this period that the soul or spirit, as the cen-
tral ingredient of being human, was largely replaced by individual reason. 
Because each of us possesses the power of reason, it was (and is) main-
tained, we may challenge the right of any authority—religious or other-
wise—to declare what is real, rational, or good for all. It is this Enlightenment 
view that has since been used to justify the institutions of democracy, 
public education, and judicial procedure, among others. It is by living 
within such institutions that we come to accept the conception as “the 
natural condition of being human.”
Anthropologists largely concur in this conclusion. As Clifford Geertz, 
a doyen of the discipline, once wrote: 
The Western conception of the person as a bounded, unique, more 
or less integrated motivational and cognitive universe, a dynamic 
center of awareness, emotion, judgment, and action organized into a 
distinctive whole and set contrastively both against other such wholes 
and against a social and natural background is, however incorrigible 
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PROLOGUE xv
it may seem to us, a rather peculiar idea within the context of the 
world’s cultures.1
In effect, this common view of bounded being and its realization in 
individualist forms of life is one that we have collectively created. And if 
this construction is delimiting, oppressive, and destructive, we may also 
create alternatives.2
It is the challenge of the present work to search beyond the traditions 
of the Enlightenment. My attempt is to generate an account of human 
action that can replace the presumption of bounded selves with a vision of 
relationship. I do not mean relationships between otherwise separate selves, 
but rather, a process of coordination that precedes the very concept of the 
self. My hope is to demonstrate that virtually all intelligible action is born, 
sustained, and/or extinguished within the ongoing process of relationship. 
From this standpoint there is no isolated self or fully private experience. 
Rather, we exist in a world of co-constitution. We are always already emerg-
ing from relationship; we cannot step out of relationship; even in our most 
private moments we are never alone. Further, as I will suggest, the future 
well-being of the planet depends signifi cantly on the extent to which we 
can nourish and protect not individuals, or even groups, but the generative 
processes of relating.
Although the central challenge is that of bringing the reality of rela-
tionship into clear view, I do not intend this work as an exercise in theory. 
I am not interested in creating a work fi t only for academic consumption. 
Rather, my attempt is to link this view of relationship to our daily lives. 
The concept of relational being should ultimately gain its meaning from 
our ways of going on together. By cementing the concept to forms of 
action, my hope is also to invite transformation in our institutions—in our 
classrooms, organizations, research laboratories, therapy offi ces, places of 
worship, and chambers of government. It is the future of our lives together 
that is at stake here, both locally and globally. 
The reader must be warned. This proposal for a relation-centered 
alternative to the traditional view of self will be discomforting. A critical 
1Geertz, C . (1979). From the native’s point of view: On the nature of anthropological under-
standing. In P. Rabinow and W. M. Sullivan (Eds.) Interpretive social science. Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press. (p. 59).
2Excellent overviews of the historical shifts in the Western understanding of the self since the 
Enlightenment are contained in Taylor, C. (1992). Sources of the self, the making of modern identity.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; and Seigel, J. (2005). The idea of the self. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
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xvi PROLOGUE
challenge to the self has broad ramifi cations. We commonly suppose, 
for example, that people have effects on each other. As we say, parents 
mold their children’s personality, schools have effects on students’ minds, 
and the mass media have an impact on the attitudes and values of the 
population. Yet, this common presumption of cause and effect is at one 
with the tradition of bounded being. That is, it relies on conception of 
fundamentally separate entities, related to each other like the collision of 
billiard balls. In the present work I will propose that we move beyond cause 
and effect in understanding relationships. Nor, by bracketing the presump-
tion of cause and effect, do I mean to celebrate determinism’s alter, namely 
free will. The view of a freely choosing agent also sustains the tradition of 
bounded being. The vision of relational being will invite us, then, to set 
aside the freedom/determinism opposition, and to consider the world in 
terms of relational confl uence.
This is not to say that I wish to destroy the traditional views of self, 
causality, and agency. I am not proposing that these traditional views are 
somehow false, that our traditions are fundamentally mistaken. Such 
assumptions are neither true nor false; they are simply human construc-
tions around which we organize our lives. For example, we cannot ask 
whether the concept of justice is true; however, we may live or die depend-
ing on whether we believe a law is just or unjust. It is the fact that we live 
our lives within these understandings of independent selves, freedom, and 
determinism that make them worthy of serious refl ection. And, if human 
connection can become as real to us as the traditional sense of individual 
separation, so do we enrich our potentials for living. Our traditions do 
have value; they are worth sustaining. However, such traditions should be 
treated as optional as opposed to defi ning the limits of our world. It is the 
development of a new alternative to which the present work is dedicated.
With this said, the reader may be willing to refl ect with me as well on 
the utility of other assumptions and practices consistent with the tradition 
of bounded being. In the following pages I will also call into question the 
reality of mental illness, the signifi cance of the brain in determining human 
behavior, the presumption of Truth, and the importance of educating indi-
vidual minds. Questions will also be raised concerning the ultimate value 
of community, of democracy, and individual responsibility. Again, my 
attempt is not to judge the truth or falsity of these traditions, only their 
implications for our lives today. But consider: By presuming that people 
are “mentally ill” we obliterate more hopeful interpretations; by presuming 
the brain determines our actions, we fail to see that the brain is a servant in 
our quest for meaningful lives; by embracing Truth we eliminate the voices 
of all those who do not view the world in the same way; by stressing the 
education of individual minds we obscure the dependence of knowledge 
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PROLOGUE xvii
on relationships. Further, when we prize the community we invite ruptures 
between communities; by viewing the individual as the basis of democracy 
we suppress the importance of dialogue in fostering critical deliberation; 
and in holding individuals responsible we obscure our own contribution to 
untoward outcomes. We can do better.
Textual Companions
It should be clear that I do not embark on this journey into relational 
being as a lone thinker. Mine is not the fi rst attempt to articulate a relation-
ship-centered alternative to the tradition of bounded being. Indeed, it is 
largely to an array of textual companions that the present work owes its 
existence. I carry with me myriad voices, supportive, challenging, inspiring. 
It is appropriate to acknowledge this debt. In doing so the historical loca-
tion of the work will become more apparent. Of equal importance, this 
précis will illuminate the major ways in which the present work deviates 
from the past. Scholars from the social sciences and philosophy have been 
especially important companions.
The Social Science Legacy
Paramount among my “textual friends” is a family of innovative social 
theorists whose writings span more than a century. In my graduate school 
days, imagined conversations with the classic work of William James,3
Charles Horton Cooley,4 and George Herbert Mead5 were especially impor-
tant. Each of these theorists painted a picture of the person as one whose 
self-understanding depended upon the views of others. The concepts of 
“the social self,” the “looking glass self,” and symbolic interaction formed a 
major challenge to the dominant view of the mind as a self-contained 
entity. For these theorists, one’s sense of self was not so much a personal 
possession as a refl ection of one’s social existence. In my later graduate 
years, I had the good fortune of working with the social psychologist John 
Thibaut. For Thibaut the mental world took on a more rugged cast, with 
the maximization of personal gain viewed as the major goal. However, as 
3James, W. (1890). Principles of psychology. New York: Henry Holt. 
4Cooley, C. H. (1902). Human nature and the social order. New York: Charles Scribner.
5Mead, G. H. (1934). Mind, self and society. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. For more 
on the early development of thought on the social mind, see also Valsiner, J. and van der Veer, R. 
(2000). The social mind: Construction of the idea. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; and 
Burkitt, I. (2008). Social selves (2nd ed.). London: Sage.
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xviii PROLOGUE
Thibaut and Kelley proposed,6 individual maximization cannot be cut 
away from the relationship in which one is engaged. One’s outcomes are 
intricately linked to processes of bargaining and negotiation. The mental 
world and social worlds were inextricably linked.
After graduate school I had the good fortune of teaching in Harvard’s 
Department of Social Relations. It was here that I discovered the revolu-
tionary work of the Russian developmentalist Lev Vygotsky. His writings 
also challenged the dominant view of isolated minds.7 As he proposed, 
at least for the higher mental processes, everything that is in mind is fi rst in 
the social world. In this sense, individual psychological functioning is a 
cultural derivative. These ideas also informed the work of numerous other 
theorists whose work has since been a deeply nourishing. John Shotter has 
been a dialogic companion for many years, and there is little in this book 
that has not been touched in some way by this cherished relationship.8
Similarly, Jerome Bruner,9 Rom Harré,10 Richard Shweder,11 Jaan Valsiner,12
and Michael Cole13 offered lively conversation in addition to their stimulat-
ing writings in cultural psychology. In all these works, the cultural context 
is celebrated for its impact on mental function. 
The Department of Social Relations also offered me the good fortune 
of working with the sociologist, Chad Gordon. It was through Chad that I 
also became intrigued with the writings of Harold Garfi nkel and other 
ethnomethodological scholars.14 These works were enormously stimulating 
as they shifted the focus from the psychological world to the interactive 
processes responsible for mental attributions. Erving Goffman’s presence at 
6Thibaut, J. and Kelley, H. (1959). The social psychology of groups. New York: Wiley.
7Vygotsky, L. (1978). Mind and society: Development of higher psychological processes. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
8Shotter, J. (1993). Cultural politics of everyday life: Social constructionism, rhetoric and know-
ing of the third kind. Toronto: University of Toronto Press; (2008) Conversational realities revisited: 
Life, language, body and world. Chagrin Falls, OH: Taos Institute Publications.
9See, for example, Bruner, J. S. (1990). Acts of meaning: Four lectures on mind and culture. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, Bruner, J. S. (1996). The culture of education.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
10Harré, R. (1979). Social being. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. (Also, issued in 1993 in a 2nd edition 
by the same publisher).
11Shweder, R. (1991). Thinking through cultures: Expeditions in cultural psychology. Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press.
12See, for example, Valsiner J., and R. Van Der Veer, op cit.
13Cole, M. (1996). Cultural psychology: A once and future discipline. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press.
14Garfi nkel, H. (1967). Studies in ethnomethodology. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. 
See also Coulter, J. (1979). The social construction of mind: Studies in ethnomethodology and linguistic 
philosophy. Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefi eld.
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PROLOGUE xix
Harvard and the University of Pennsylvania generated an enriching colle-
gial relationship extending to his death in 1982. His work also shifted the 
focus from the individual actor to the plane of relationship. For Goffman 
human action was largely social performance, and thus, the self was a 
byproduct of the theatrical conditions of the moment.15 Much of this early 
work was ultimately collected in an edited volume, with Chad Gordon, 
The self in social interaction.16
Perhaps the next major watershed in deliberations on relational being 
issued from feminist theory. I owe my education here largely to my wife 
and feminist scholar, Mary Gergen.17 Our friendship with Carol Gilligan18
was also signifi cant, and her challenge to Kohlberg’s cognitive view of 
moral decision was the subject of many engaging conversations. Here, one 
could discern most clearly the political implications of shifting from an 
individualist to a relational conception of the person. The works of Jean 
Baker Miller,19 Judith Jordan,20 and their colleagues at at Wellesley College’s 
Stone Center greatly expanded the relational vision. From their perspective 
there is a natural yearning for relationship. In order for this yearning to be 
fulfi lled, one must experience growth-fostering relationships in which 
mutual empathy and empowerment are central. 
I have also drawn continuing stimulation from writings in the thera-
peutic tradition. For me, the work of socially oriented psychiatrists such as 
Erich Fromm21 and Karen Horney22 had always seemed more relevant to my 
life than Freud’s rather hermetic conception of psychological process. Both 
saw culture and mind as fundamentally interdependent. Mental conditions 
were refl ections of our social institutions, and in turn, our institutions were 
byproducts of our personal needs and desires. These views were resonant 
as well with Harry Stack Sullivan’s interpersonal approach to psychiatry, 
15See especially, Goffman, E. (1959). The presentation of self in everyday life. Garden City, NY: 
Doubleday; Goffman, E. (1961). Asylums: Essays on the social situation of mental patients and other 
inmates. Bolton, MA: Anchor.
16New York: Wiley, 1968.
17See especially her volumes, Feminist thought and the structure of knowledge. New York: 
New York University Press, 1988; Feminist reconstructions in psychology: Narrative, gender & perfor-
mance. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2001.
18See Gilligan, C. (1993). In a different voice: Psychological theory and women’s development.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
19Miller, J. B. (1976). Toward a new psychology of women. Boston, MA: Beacon Press.
20Jordan, J., Kaplan, A., Miller, J. B., Stiver, I., Surrey, J. L. (1991). Women’s growth in 
connection. New York: Guilford; Jordan, J. V. (1997). Women’s growth in diversity: More writings 
from the Stone Center. New York: Guilford.
21Fromm, E. (1941). Escape from freedom. New York: Rinehart.
22Horney, K. (1950). Neurosis and human growth. New York: Norton.
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xx PROLOGUE
and Carl Rogers’ humanist theory and practice.23 Similar to the Stone 
Center feminists, both saw the development of individual well-being as 
fully dependent on relationships. The Stone Center group also drew heav-
ily from the writings of object relations theorists in psychiatry.24 Abandoning 
Freud’s emphasis on pleasure seeking, the emphasis was placed instead on 
the individual’s attachments with signifi cant others. Early patterns of 
attachment (and rejection) laid down tracks of life-long consequence. This 
work has been extended by the fascinating work of Stephen Mitchell and 
his colleagues to provide a relational account of the therapeutic process. On 
this view, the meeting of the client and therapist is the inter-twining of two 
complex and dynamic, relational histories.25
This rich history of social science writing poses a signifi cant challenge 
to the individualist tradition. Why is it necessary to add yet a further trea-
tise? What does the present work offer that is not already in place? For me 
the major agitation derives from the inability of most of these formulations 
to separate themselves suffi ciently from the individualist tradition. There 
are three signifi cant residues that can be found in one form or another in 
most all these formulations. First, for many there is the continued focus on 
a mental world in itself, a world that ultimately functions as the source of 
individual action. It is variously a world of symbols, experience, cognition, 
emotion, motives, and/or dynamic processes. In each case attention is 
directed to an inner region, one that is importantly infl uenced by the social 
surrounds, but signifi cant in its own right. The strong sense of a psycho-
logical center of action remains solid. My attempt in this work is to remove 
the reality of a distinctly inner or mental world. This is not to replace it 
with a behaviorist view of “everything on the surface.” Rather, the attempt 
is to eliminate the very distinction between inner and outer, and to replace 
it with a view of relationally embodied action.
Second, there is strong tendency in many of these writings to theorize 
in terms of separate units, the self and other, the person and culture, the 
individual and society. Relationships on this account are the result of dis-
tinct entities coming into contact, they are derivative of the fundamentally 
23Sullivan, H. S. (1953). The interpersonal theory of psychiatry. William Alanson White 
Psychiatric Foundation. Reissued by Norton, 1997; Rogers, C. (1961). On becoming a person: 
A therapist’s view of psychotherapy. New York: Houghton Miffl in.
24For an overview, see Mitchell, S. (1988). Relational conceptions in psychoanalysis: An integra-
tion. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. See also, Curtis, R. C. (Ed.) (1991). The relational 
self: Theoretical convergences in psychoanalysis and social psychology. New York: Guilford. 
25See for example, Mitchell, S. A. (1993). Hope and dread in psychoanalysis. New York: Basic 
Books; Pizer, S. A. (1998). Building bridges: The negotiation of paradox in psychoanalysis. New York: 
Analytic Press.
C
op
yr
ig
ht
 ©
 2
00
9.
 O
xf
or
d 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 P
re
ss
, I
nc
or
po
ra
te
d.
 A
ll 
rig
ht
s 
re
se
rv
ed
.
PROLOGUE xxi
separate units. My attempt here is to reverse the order, and to treat what we 
take to be the individual units as derivative of relational process. Closely 
related, there is a strong tendency within many of these writings to employ 
a causal template in explaining human action. Thus, there is a tendency to 
speak of the culture, society, family, or intimate others as “infl uencing,” 
“having an effect on,” or “determining the actions of ” the individual. Again, 
such an analytic posture sustains the presumption of independent beings, 
and defi nes relationships as their derivative.
With this said, however, there are passages, metaphors, and insights 
within these traditions that will make their way into the present work. My 
attempt here is not to abandon this rich and signifi cant work so much as to 
stretch its implications to the point that a more fundamental paradigm 
shift can be take place. As Brent Slife would put it, many of the existing 
attempts represent a weak relationality, or social inter-action; the attempt 
here is to generate a “strong relationality,” one in which there is no 
condition of independence.26 In this respect, there are other social science 
scholars and practitioners whose writings are more immediately congenial 
with the proposals of the present work. Their writings, and often our con-
versations, play an integral role in the emerging thesis, and will later be 
acknowledged.
Philosophic Inheritance
From the early writings of Descartes, Locke, and Kant to contempo-
rary discussions of mind and brain, philosophers have lent strong support 
to the reality of bounded being. In many respects, the hallmark of Western 
philosophy was its presumption of dualism: mind and world, subject and 
object, self and other. Yet, the fi eld of philosophy also thrives on disputa-
tion. Thus, while the individualist view of human functioning has been 
dominant, there are signifi cant defectors. In developing the proposals for 
relational being, a number of these have made lively textual companions. 
An early enchantment with existentialism lead me, for one, to the work of 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Although placing individual consciousness at 
the center of his writings, Merleau-Ponty also argued for a consciousness 
that was deeply inhabited by the other.27 One’s perception of the other, 
he proposed, contains within it a consciousness of being perceived by the 
26Slife, B. (2004). Taking practices seriously: Toward a relational ontology. Journal of 
Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology. 24, 179–195.
27cf. Merleau-Ponty, M. (1968). The visible and the invisible. Evanston, IL: Northwestern 
University Press.
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xxii PROLOGUE
other. As one observes the other during a conversation, for example, one is 
simultaneously conscious of being observed. The two forms of conscious-
ness are inextricable. Or again, the consciousness of touching another also 
embodies consciousness of being touched by another. As we caress another, 
we are also conscious of what it is to be caressed by another. 
Closely related was the work of Martin Heidegger. Like Merleau-
Ponty, much of Heidegger’s analysis treats the phenomenological world 
of consciousness. At the same time, Heidegger attempted to subvert the 
traditional subject/object dichotomy, in which there are conscious subjects 
contrasted with a separate world of objects “out there.”28 For Heidegger, 
consciousness is always consciousness of something. Remove all objects 
of consciousness, and there is no consciousness; remove all consciousness 
and objects cease to exist. Thus subject and object are fundamentally 
co-existent. The insertion of dashes between the words of his pivotal con-
cept, Being-in-the-world, functions as a visual illustration of the concep-
tual breaking of the traditional binary. Although emerging from the soil of 
American pragmatism, the work of John Dewey and Arthur Bentley reso-
nates with Heidegger’s binary-breaking innovation. As they saw it, there is 
a mutually constituting relationship between the person and the object 
(mind and world).29 Thus they argued for replacing the traditional view of 
inter-action (independent objects in causal relationship with experience), 
with the concept of transaction. 
Although fascinated by these attempts, they do not take me far enough. 
Again, they begin with the presumption of a private space of consciousness, 
and through various analytic strategies, attempt to escape. My hope, on the 
contrary, is to begin with an account of relational process and derive from 
it a conception of individual consciousness. Further, to appreciate the 
works of these philosophers one must crawl inside a highly complex and 
exotic world of words. The major concepts acquire their meaning largely 
from the way they are used within the philosophic texts. There is little exit 
to social practice, a concern that is central to my efforts. 
I have also drawn signifi cant inspiration from a number of moral phi-
losophers whose work blurs the boundaries between self and other. John 
MacMurray’s Persons in Relationship30 was of early interest. Here the chief 
concern was the preeminent value of relationship or community as opposed 
to individual well-being. For MacMurray special stress was placed on indi-
vidual sacrifi ce to the communal good. Echoing this latter view is the more 
28Heidegger, M. (1962). Being and time. New York: Harper & Row.
29Dewey, J., and Bentley, A. F. (1949). Knowing and the known. Boston: Beacon.
30MacMurray, J. (1961). Persons in relation. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press.
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PROLOGUE xxiii
widely known phenomenological work of Emmanuel Levinas.31 For Levinas, 
individual subjectivity is not independent of others. Rather, personal 
consciousness is constituted by the existence of the other (metaphorically, 
“the face of the other”). In this sense one is fundamentally responsible for 
the other; ethics and consciousness are co-terminal. Perhaps the most 
signifi cant contribution to the present work is Martin Buber’s volume,
I and Thou.32 Buber distinguishes between two modes of consciousness 
(phenomenological states), in terms of one’s relation to the other. In the 
most common mode (I–It), the other is an object, fundamentally separate 
from self. Sacred for Buber, however, is the I–Thou relationship in which the 
other is encountered without boundaries. In this sense there is a mutually 
absorbing unity; the conceptual distinction between persons disappears.
Yet, while these works have been inspiring, they still retain what for 
me are problematic vestiges of the individualist tradition. Although the 
community is ultimately prized by MacMurray, it is achieved through the 
voluntary acts of individual agents. For all their concern with relationship, 
the works of both Levinas and Buber still remain allied with the phenom-
enological or subjectivity-centered tradition. Moral action is ultimately 
dependent on the voluntary decision of the actor. Further, it is not clear in 
these cases what kind of action is entailed. In Levinas’ case, a strong empha-
sis is placed on self-sacrifi ce. However, the landscape of relevant action is 
never made apparent. For Buber, the I–Thou encounter is the exception to 
the common condition of I–It separation. However, if moved by Buber’s 
analysis to embrace the sacred posture of I–Thou, it is not clear what fol-
lows in terms of action. What is it, exactly, to encounter another as Thou? 
In contrast, my hope is to link the vision of relational being to particular 
forms of social practice.
There is also an enormously important line of scholarship stemming 
from sociological and political theory. This work is especially important 
in its critique of liberal individualism, both in terms of its infl uence on 
cultural life and its adequacy as an orientation to civil society and politics. 
In terms of the injuries to daily life, the volume, Habits of the Heart: 
Individualism and Commitment in American Life, by Robert Bellah and his 
colleagues, was pivotal in its signifi cance.33 This work revealed in touching 
detail the insidious implications of individualist ideology for human relation-
ships. This volume also resonated with the initiatives of the communitarian 
31Levinas. E. (1985). Ethics and infi nity. (R. A. Cohen, Trans.). Pittsburgh: Duquesne 
University Press.
32New York: Free Press, 1971. (Original English edition, 1937).
33Bellah, R. N., Madsen, R., Sullivan, W. M., Swidler, A., and Tipton, S. M. (1985). Habits
of the heart: Individuals and commitment in American life. Berkeley: University of California Press.
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xxiv PROLOGUE
movement, spearheaded by Amitai Etzioni and his colleagues.34 Here the 
strong emphasis is on one’s obligations to the community as opposed to 
claims to individual rights. The work of political theorist, Michael Sandel,35
and philosopher, Alasdair MacIntyre36 add important conceptual dimen-
sion to this movement. They draw attention to the deep lodgment of the 
individual in relationships, and fi nd the idea of the unencumbered, free 
agent seriously fl awed. These various works have been invaluable sources of 
illumination for me. However, I have been less content with the valoriza-
tion of community favored as the alternative to individualism. There is not 
only the problem of determining the boundaries of what constitutes one’s 
community. There are additional complications resulting from the very 
drawing of these boundaries. Communities are also bounded entities and 
create the same kinds of confl icts that attend our viewing persons as funda-
mentally separated. In the case of communal commitments—including the 
religious and political—the consequences can be disastrous. 
In the pages that follow, there will be echoes of these important works. 
However, there are other philosophical writings that are more congenial to 
the present undertaking. Foremost are the latter writings of Ludwig 
Wittgenstein. His textual companionship has been of enormous signifi -
cance, and without his Philosophical Investigations,37 I suspect the present 
undertaking would never have gotten under way. The literary theorist, 
Mikhail Bakhtin, is also a prominent voice throughout this work. Although 
never fully severing mind from action, his multi-hued concept of dialogism 
has been richly stimulating. 
At the same time, there is one important difference that separates the 
present work from all the preceding theorists (save Wittgenstein). These 
various philosophers have labored in a tradition concerned with establish-
ing foundations, that is, grounding accounts of reason, truth, human 
nature, ethical value, and so on. Sometimes such accounts are called “fi rst 
philosophies.” In contrast, the present work holds no such aspirations. 
Although the form of writing may sometimes suggest the contrary, my aim 
is not to articulate what simply is, or must be, the nature of human nature. 
My aim is neither to be true nor accurate in traditional terms. Rather, my 
hope is to offer a compelling construction of the world, an inviting vision, 
34See, for example, Etzioni, A. (1993). The spirit of community: Rights, responsibilities and the 
communitarian agenda. New York: Crown.
35See, for example, Sandel, M. (1996). Democracy’s discontent: America in search of a public 
philosophy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
36See especially, MacIntyre, A. (1981). After virtue. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame 
Press.
37Wittgenstein, L. (1978). Philosophical investigations. Oxford: Blackwell.
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PROLOGUE xxv
or a lens of understanding—all realized or embodied in relevant action. 
The account is not a set of marching orders, but an invitation to a dance. 
Engaging the Writing
Challenging traditions always carries risks. Even when our traditions 
are fl awed, at least they are comfortable fl aws. Change invites fear of what 
follows. These are also my experiences in writing this work. With the slow 
unfolding of this vision of relational being, I have also come to refl ect criti-
cally on my own ways of being in the world. One comfortable convention 
targeted by my critical gaze was my practice of professional writing. As I 
came to see, traditional scholarly writing also carries with it strong traces of 
the individualist tradition. It is a genre that separates the knowing author 
from the ignorant reader; it positions the author as the owner of his or her 
own ideas; it often portrays the author as one whose mind is fully coherent, 
confi dent, and confl ict free. I will have more to say about this tradition in 
Chapter 7. Yet, one’s form of writing is also a medium that carries a mes-
sage, and in the present work it is a message that undermines the relational 
thesis I wish to advance.
My aim in the pages that follow is to explore a form of writing that 
more fully embodies the relational thesis. How is this so? As you will fi nd, 
the writing proceeds as a series of “punctuated layers.” The layers will also 
embody different traditions of communication. At times, my scholarly 
voice will dominate; at other times I will write in a way that is more conge-
nial to practitioners: I also include personal experiences relevant to the 
subject at hand. In addition to these layers, I have added aesthetic voices—
art, poetry, photography—and even touches of humor. At times I will 
weave into the mix the expressions of friends, both textual and personal. 
There are several ways in which I hope this form of writing serves to 
convey content. First, the use of multiple voices makes it more diffi cult to 
identify who I am, as the author. Without a single, coherent voice it is 
more diffi cult to defi ne the boundaries of my being. Further, as the thesis 
unfolds I will characterize persons as embedded within multiple relation-
ships. Who and what we are is constituted quite differently in many of 
these relationships. Thus, we all carry many different voices, each born 
of a specifi c history of relationship. By using multiple “voices” in the text, 
my hope is that the reader will come to appreciate the many relations 
from which “I as author” have sprung. Moreover, in using these various 
voices, my hope is to open a relationship with a broader range of readers. 
In writing for a single audience—for example, scholars, practitioners, 
or students—I strengthen the walls between groups in society. By using 
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xxvi PROLOGUE
multiple genres perhaps a step can be taken to cross the existing boundar-
ies, and to invite more inclusive dialogue. Finally, in contrast to traditional 
writing, the attempt is to relinquish some control over how the words are 
to be understood. By juxtaposing mixed genres, my hope is to avoid dis-
tinct closure of meaning. A space is opened for the reader to generate new 
associations and images.
Challenges of Language
In addition to the form of writing, a preliminary note on issues of 
language use will be helpful. First, I had a strong urge in writing this book 
to use the phrase, relational self, as opposed to relational being. This would 
have placed the volume more clearly in the long and estimable tradition of 
writings on the self. However, the term “self ” carries with it strong traces 
of the individualist tradition. It suggests again a bounded unit, one that inter-
acts with other distinct units. Further, the “self ” is a noun, and thus sug-
gests a static and enduring entity. However, the term “being,” ambiguously 
poised as participle, noun, and gerund, subverts the image of a bounded 
unit. In being, we are in motion, carrying with us a past as we move through 
the present into a becoming. 
The second issue of language use is more complex. Central to this 
work is a view of relationship that is not defi ned in terms of two or more 
persons coming together. Rather, as I will propose, the very idea of indi-
vidual persons is a byproduct of relational process. But how can I describe 
this process without using a language that inherently divides the world into 
bounded entities? To be more specifi c, by relying on common conventions 
of writing, I will invariably rely on nouns and pronouns, both of which 
designate bounded or identifi able units. The very phrase,” I rely on you….” 
already defi nes me as separate from you. Similarly, transitive verbs typically 
imply causal relations, with the action of one unit impinging on another. 
To say, “He invited her,” or “she treated him nicely” again creates a world 
of separation. Try as I may to create a sense of process that precedes the 
construction of entities, the conventions of language resist. They virtually 
insist that separate entities exist prior to relationship.
It is tempting here to experiment with new linguistic forms that might 
erase the troublesome boundaries. Both Heidegger and Derrida have done 
so, the fi rst by placing hyphens between words, and the second by striking 
through them. However, there is a danger in abandoning the common 
conventions of communication; the major thesis may be thrust into obscu-
rity. My choice, then, is to retain the common usages, and to rely on the 
good will of the reader to appreciate the dilemma. I will thus write of 
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PROLOGUE xxvii
relationships in the traditional way—of this person’s relation to that, of her 
relationship to him, of this organization related to another. However, the 
reader may also benefi t from a heuristic I found useful in writing, namely 
a logic of placeholders. When I write about the individual, the person, 
myself, I, me, you, and so on I will use the words in the conventional way. 
However, I will hold out a place in which they can be understood as emer-
gents of relationship. For example, I may write of “Ronald’s relationship to 
Maria,” as if they existed independently. The convention helps me to com-
municate with you as reader. However, as I write I also hold a place for 
realizing that both these names are constructions created in a relational 
process that preceded the names. Further, even the common separation we 
make between one physical body and the other, are constructions born of 
relationship. The belief that the skin marks the separation of the body from 
the world is a useful fi ction that we have developed together. Yet, the 
moment I try to describe what a word like “together” means, the language 
will grasp me by the throat. I will speak as if two physically separate entities 
were meeting. I can only hope that you can join me in being aware that 
we are holding out a place in which we can understand the very idea of 
“physical entities” as a byproduct of relational process.
The Unfolding Narrative
In the choice of layered writing, the reader may sometimes lose the 
over-arching logic of this work. Thus, a guide to the unfolding tale may 
be useful. In the initial chapter I hope to make clear why the search for 
relational being is so important, why this is not an exercise in theoretical 
gymnastics, but an invitation to explore new and more promising forms of 
life. Here I am joined by many scholars who share in their discontent with 
the individualist tradition. The initial chapter will assemble many of these 
voices into a “chorus of critique.” With the chorus in place, we can then 
embark on the exploration of relational being. 
I will use the next three chapters to introduce the concept of relational 
being. Chapter 2 will focus on the pivotal concept of co-action, or the pro-
cess of collaborative action from which all meaning is generated. Or in 
general terms, it is from co-action that we develop meaningful realities, 
rationalities, and moralities. It is in this process that a world of bounded 
entities is created, and through which alternative worlds may be estab-
lished. This argument also prepares the way for Chapters 3 and 4, in which 
I will revisit the vast vocabulary of mental life so central to the individualist 
tradition. If all meaning issues from relationship, then we may include the 
very idea of mental life. Unlike Descartes, individual reason is not the 
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xxviii PROLOGUE
source of human action; rather, the concept of individual reason is an 
outcome of relationship. In these two chapters I will thus attempt to recast 
the vocabulary of the psychological world in relational terms. I will develop 
the thesis that terms such as “thinking,” “remembering,” “experiencing,” 
and “feeling,” do not refer to events inside the head of the individual, but 
to coordinated actions within relationship. 
In the two chapters (Part II) that follow, I begin to shift the focus from 
theory to practice, and particularly to matters of everyday life and death. 
New conceptual territory will be opened, but with a sharper eye to its 
implications for action. In Chapter 5, the pivotal concept of multi-being 
will be developed. As an outcome of immersion in multiple relationships, 
I will propose, we emerge as rich in potential for relationship. However, 
the realization of this potential can also be radically diminished in any 
given relationship. This discussion will give way to a concern with the art 
of coordinating action. In Chapter 6 the issue of social bonding will become 
focal. While social bonding can be deeply nurturing, my particular concern 
in this case is with the destructive repercussions. This treatment will invite 
a discussion of dialogic practices for restoring relationship between antago-
nistic parties.
The next four chapters (comprising Part III) are more specifi cally 
devoted to societal practices. If our sense of bounded being is fortifi ed by 
existing practices, what kinds of changes are necessary to appreciate the 
power of relationship? In my view, there is a sea change taking place across 
many professions, in which the focus on the single individual is being 
replaced with fostering effective relationships. These chapters will bring 
many of these offerings into concert. In Chapter 7 the focus is on knowl-
edge as a relational achievement. Replacing the heroic accounts of the indi-
vidual discoverer, I will propose that what we call knowledge emerges 
from the process of co-action. I will then consider three relevant sites of 
practice—the creation of disciplines, the act of writing, and the practice 
of social science research. In each of these instances, there is a need for 
replacing fragmentation and confl ict with productive coordination. This 
discussion will prepare the way for an extended treatment of education in 
Chapter 8. If knowledge is achieved through relationship, then educators 
should shift their attention from the individual student to the nexus of 
relationships in which education occurs. In this discussion I will focus most 
particularly on pedagogical practices as they are fostered in relations 
between teachers and students, among students themselves, between class-
room and community, and between classroom and global communities.
Therapeutic practices take center stage in Chapter 9. Here I suspend 
the traditional focus of therapy on the individual and replace it with a view 
of therapy as relational recovery. If human anguish is born within the 
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PROLOGUE xxix
process of collaborative action, then collaborative process should serve as 
the central focus of therapy. This does not demand so much an abandon-
ment of traditional therapy, as a rethinking of the way these practices 
contribute (or not) to relational well-being. This discussion of relational 
recovery prepares the way for the subsequent treatment of organizational 
life (Chapter 10). Traditional organizations are viewed as collections of 
single individuals, each hired, advanced, or terminated on the basis of indi-
vidual knowledge, skills, and motivation. In this chapter I replace this view 
with relational process as the critical element to effective organizing. Within 
this context I will take up specifi c practices of decision making, leadership, 
personnel evaluation, and the relationship of the organization to its 
surrounds.
In the concluding chapters (Part IV) I step back to refl ect on broader 
implications of relational being. In Chapter 11, I consider the moral conse-
quences of these deliberations. There is a strong relativist message that fol-
lows from the view that all moral values emerge from relational histories. 
Must relativism be our conclusion? Here I make a case for relational respon-
sibility, that is, the shared responsibility for sustaining those processes out 
of which moral values are generated. In the fi nal chapter, I take up issues of 
spirituality. Can a bridge be formed, I ask, between the secular account of 
relational being developed and traditions of spirituality? A bridge to dia-
logue between these traditions is found in the ultimate impossibility of 
grasping the nature of relational process. This same inability is also found 
in numerous theological attempts to locate the nature of the sacred. There 
is a space, then, for appreciating the sacred potential of collaborative prac-
tices. Daily life takes on spiritual signifi cance.
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